Introduction
Evidentialism is the thesis, roughly, that one's beliefs should fit one's evidence. The enkratic principle is the thesis, roughly, that one should see to it that one's beliefs cohere with one's beliefs about which beliefs one ought to have. Both theses have seemed attractive to many philosophers. However, they jointly imply a controversial conclusion, namely that a certain kind of self-misleading evidence is impossible. That is to say, if evidentialism and the enkratic principle are both true, it is impossible for one's evidence to support certain false beliefs about what one's evidence supports.
But a number of philosophers have recently argued that self-misleading evidence is possible on the grounds that misleading higher-order evidence does not have the kind of strong and systematic defeating force that would be needed to rule out the possibility of selfmisleading evidence. If they are right, we are left with a seemingly unattractive choice between sacrificing the enkratic principle on the altar of evidentialism, or vice versa. In other words, anyone who wants to save both evidentialism and the enkratic principle faces a challenge of explaining why cases of misleading higher-order evidence are, in fact, not cases of selfmisleading evidence.
The aim of this chapter is to propose a view of higher-order evidence that does indeed render self-misleading evidence impossible. Central to the view is the idea that higher-order evidence acquires its normative significance by influencing which conditional beliefs it is rational to have. I shall say more to clarify and motivate this idea in due course. But what I hope will emerge is an independently plausible view of higher-order evidence that has the additional benefit of allowing us to retain both evidentialism and the enkratic principle.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I begin by offering more precise formulations of evidentialism and the enkratic principle, before explaining why they jointly imply that a certain sort of self-misleading evidence is impossible. In §3, I then review what I take to be the most pressing challenge, due to Worsnip (2018) , against the view that self-misleading evidence is impossible, and argue that the challenge is unconvincing as it stands. In §4, I proceed to outline and motivate a view of the normative significance of higherorder evidence, which not only offers a diagnosis of where Worsnip's challenge goes wrong, but also lends positive support to the view that self-misleading evidence is impossible. In §5, I provide further motivation of the proposed view by showing how it may help explain a number of distinctive features of higher-order evidence that have been highlighted in the recent literature. Finally, in §6, I briefly sum up.
Evidentialism, Enkrasia, and Self-Misleading Evidence
Let me begin with a few remarks on terminology and notation. As usual, if p is a proposition, I will write 'Bp' to say that p is believed by the relevant agent. Furthermore, if a is a doxastic attitude towards some proposition, I will use the following shorthands to talk about epistemic rationality and evidential support: ra: a is rationally permitted ea: a is sufficiently supported by the evidence Ra: a is rationally required Ea: a is decisively supported by the evidence If a is not rationally permitted, I will also say that a is rationally forbidden. The operators R and E will be treated as duals of r and e in the usual way: a is rationally required if and only if ~a is not rationally permitted, and a is decisively supported by the evidence if and only if ~a is not sufficiently supported by the evidence. I will not rely on any particular semantics for the operators r, R, e, and E, but formally inclined readers may think of them as pairs of possibility and necessity operators from standard epistemic and deontic logic, in the tradition of Hintikka (1962; 1971) .
On my usage of the term 'evidential support', it is doxastic attitudes towards propositions rather than propositions themselves that are said to be (or not to be) supported by the evidence. For convenience, I will also sometimes say about a proposition that it is supported by the evidence, but this should be understood to mean that the relevant belief in that proposition is supported by the evidence. The term 'doxastic attitude' will be used to pick out a binary rather than a graded notion. Accordingly, I will be talking about (outright) belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment, but I will not be talking about credences or levels of confidence. The reason for this choice is that the enkratic principle is traditionally understood in terms of coarse-grained "all-or-nothing" attitudes rather than in terms of graded ones. Of course, credal states can presumably also be akratic; but to keep matters relatively simple, I shall focus my attention on the traditional formulation of the enkratic principle in terms of binary attitudes.
Consider, then, the following statement of the evidentialist thesis: In particular, someone might hold that even the strongest evidence only ever makes it rationally permissible (not required) to adopt this-or-that doxastic attitude towards a given proposition. That is, someone might accept the first clause in Evidentialism, but deny the second. 1 However, since both clauses will be needed to establish the conclusion that selfmisleading evidence is impossible, I shall focus my attention on this relatively strong version of evidentialism.
How plausible is Evidentialism? It seems intuitively clear that a person's evidence somehow plays an important role in determining which doxastic attitudes it is rational for the person to adopt. If we are asked to judge whether someone's beliefs on some matter are rational, it seems perfectly appropriate to reflect on whether the person has responded in a reasonable manner to the evidence at hand. But despite its prima facie appeal, Evidentialism remains subject to ongoing debate (see, e.g., Conee and Feldman (2004) , Littlejohn (2012) , and Shah (2006) for critical discussions of evidentialism in different guises). Given the dialectics of the present paper, I do not want to enter a detailed discussion of the qualms some philosophers have had about posing a strong connection between evidential support and 1 See, e.g., Conee and Feldman (1985) and Steglich-Petersen (2018). epistemic rationality. Rather, I will simply take Evidentialism for granted in order to allow for the challenge, to which I aim to respond, to arise.
Consider, next, the following statement of the enkratic principle:
Enkratic Principle: Necessarily,
This thesis roughly says that one's doxastic attitudes should "line up" with one's beliefs about which doxastic attitudes one ought to have. More precisely, according to the first clause, one is never permitted to believe that one is required to have a doxastic attitude that one does not have. For example, one is never permitted to believe that "I should believe that it's raining" while failing to believe that "it's raining." Conversely, according to the second clause, one is never permitted to have a doxastic attitude that one believes one is not permitted to have. For example, one is never permitted to believe that "I shouldn't believe that it's raining" while believing that "it's raining." Hence, in contrast to Evidentialism, the Enkratic Principle is a structural requirement of rationality in virtue of constraining which combinations of doxastic attitudes it may be rational to have. That is, the Enkratic Principle says nothing about which particular doxastic attitudes agent should adopt, but merely asks them to maintain a certain coherence between their doxastic attitudes and their beliefs about which doxastic attitudes they ought to have.
How plausible is the Enkratic Principle? At first blush, many seem to find the principle borderline self-evident. Just as it seems manifestly irrational to believe Moorean propositions like "it's raining, but I don't believe that it's raining" or contradictory propositions like "it's raining, but it isn't raining", so it seems manifestly irrational to believe akratic propositions like "it's raining, but I shouldn't believe that it's raining." Yet, despite its prima facie appeal, the Enkratic Principle is not universally accepted among philosophers, but remains subject to ongoing debate. 2 the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence effectively rules out two kinds of self-misleading evidence as impossible: evidence that sufficiently supports believing that it does not sufficiently support a doxastic attitude that it in fact decisively supports; and evidence that sufficiently supports believing that it decisively supports a doxastic attitude that it in fact does not sufficiently support.
At this point, let me pause to explain, in informal terms, why Evidentialism and the Enkratic Principle jointly imply the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence. Begin by supposing that an agent's total evidence at once decisively supports a doxastic attitude a and sufficiently supports believing that it does not sufficiently support a. This supposition amounts to a denial of the first clause in the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence. If we furthermore assume that Evidentialism is true, it then follows that the agent in question is at once rationally required to adopt the attitude a and rationally permitted to believe that a is not sufficiently supported by the agent's evidence. Hence, the agent is at once rationally required to adopt a and rationally permitted to believe that she is not rationally permitted to adopt a. 4 Yet, this conclusion contradicts the second clause in the Enkratic Principle. Thus, if
Evidentialism and the second clause in the Enkratic Principle are both true, the first clause in the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence must be true as well. The second clause in the Impossibility in Self-Misleading Evidence can be established in a similar way using the first clause in the Enkratic Principle.
Although Evidentialism and the Enkratic Principle together rule out certain sorts of selfmisleading evidence, it is worth noting that they do not rule out all sorts of self-misleading evidence. More specifically, they are compatible with the following thesis:
Possibility of Weakly Self-Misleading Evidence: Possibly,
According to this thesis, it is indeed possible for certain false beliefs about what one's evidence supports to be supported by one's evidence. More precisely, according to the first clause, one's evidence can at once sufficiently support a doxastic attitude a and sufficiently support believing that it does not sufficiently support a. For example, my evidence might sufficiently support believing that "it's raining" while sufficiently supporting the false belief that "my evidence doesn't sufficiently support believing that it's raining." Conversely, according to the second clause, one's evidence might at once not sufficiently support a, but sufficiently support believing that it does sufficiently support a. For example, my evidence might not sufficiently support believing that "it's raining", but sufficiently support believing that "my evidence does sufficiently support believing that it's raining." We can thus sum up the foregoing observations by saying that Evidentialism and the Enkratic Principle are compatible with the possibility of weakly self-misleading evidence, but incompatible with the possibility of radically self-misleading evidence. Of course, it might seem like an ad hoc or unstable position to maintain that weakly self-misleading evidence is possible, whereas radically self-misleading evidence is not. 5 But in any case, it is worth being clear about what is a direct consequence of Evidentialism and the Enkratic Principle, and what is not.
The established connection between Evidentialism, the Enkratic Principle, and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence is going to constitute a 'dialectical fixed-point' in what follows: anyone who accepts Evidentialism and the Enkratic Principle must accept the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence as well, and anyone who rejects the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence must reject either Evidentialism or the Enkratic Principle (or both).
Eventually, I hope to show that the former option is a viable one: we can indeed reasonably deny the possibility of self-misleading evidence, and thereby put ourselves in a position to save both evidentialism and the enkratic principle. But first, I want to consider why some philosophers have thought otherwise.
Putative Cases of Self-Misleading Evidence
Consider the following two stories:
Driver's Bias: John believes himself to be above-average at driving. His belief is strongly supported by his evidence: he has many years of experience, is rarely on the phone whilst driving, and has a better crash record than most of his acquaintances. But in reading today's newspaper, John learns about the well-documented driver's bias: the tendency, especially among male subjects, to overestimate their own driving skills.
Poor Logic: Sophie and her classmates are asked to prove, independently of each other, whether a formula T is tautological or not. As it happens, Sophie makes a few errors and draws the wrong conclusion that T is non-tautological. All of Sophie's classmates happen to reach the same wrong conclusion. Sophie is aware of their agreement. What's more, the otherwise competent logic professor makes an occasional blunder and assures the students that they have reached the right conclusion.
What does John's total evidence support after having learnt about the driver's bias? And what does Sophie's total evidence support after having learnt that her logic professor and classmates unanimously agree with her?
In order to answer these questions, let us begin by taking a closer look at the evidence in each case.
In Driver's Bias, John starts out with a body of evidence consisting of information about his own driving history, which is assumed to strongly indicate that his driving skills are above average. This kind of evidence is sometimes said to be of 'first order', because it seems directly relevant to the question of whether John is better than average at driving. Thus, by assumption, John's first-order evidence strongly suggests that he is better than average at driving. However, John then receives some additional evidence, namely the information about the driver's bias, which indicates that he has overestimated his own driving skills. This kind of evidence is sometimes said to be of 'higher order', because it only seems indirectly relevant to the question of whether John's driving skills are above average (in virtue of being directly relevant to the question of whether John has overestimated his own driving skills). I shall later (in §5.4) offer a more precise characterization of this intuitive distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' evidential bearing as it applies in the context of distinguishing between first-order and higherorder evidence. But for now, it suffices to have a merely case-based understanding of the distinction.
Similarly, in Poor Logic, Sophie starts out with a body of first-order evidence consisting of her flawed proof, which does not support that T is non-tautological. She then receives a body of higher-order evidence consisting of the unanimous agreement of her classmates and logic professor, which indicates that her proof is indeed correct. That is, while her first-order evidence does not support that T is non-tautological, her higher-order evidence indicates that her first-order evidence does support that T is non-tautological.
What Driver's Bias and Poor Logic have in common is that the higher-order evidence in each case misleads about what the relevant first-order evidence supports: in Driver's Bias, the first-order evidence in fact supports that John is better than average at driving, but the higherorder evidence suggests otherwise; and, in Poor Logic, the first-order evidence in fact does not support that T is non-tautological, but the higher-order evidence suggests that it does. 6
How strong are these seemingly opposing evidential relations in Driver's Bias and Poor Logic? Given the dialectical setting, we are looking to create the most hospitable environment for counterexamples to the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence to arise. Let us therefore suppose that John's first-order evidence is strong enough to decisively support his belief that he is better than average at driving, and let us suppose that his higher-order evidence is at least strong enough to sufficiently support believing that his first-order evidence does not sufficiently support believing that he is better than average at driving. Likewise, let us suppose that Sophie's first-order evidence does not sufficiently support her belief that T is nontautological, and let us suppose that her higher-order evidence at least sufficiently supports believing that her first-order evidence decisively supports believing that T is non-tautological.
We can state these four stipulations about the evidential relations in Driver's Bias and Poor Logic more conveniently by introducing the following shorthands for the propositions featuring in the two cases (where 'F' stands for first-order, and 'H' stands for higher-order):
PF: John is better than average at driving.
PH:
John's first-order evidence sufficiently supports BPF.
QF:
The logical formula T is not tautological.
QH: Sophie's first-order evidence decisively supports BQF.
Formulated in terms of these abbreviations, our four stipulations become: John's first-order evidence decisively supports believing PF; John's higher-order evidence sufficiently supports believing ~PH; Sophie's first-order evidence does not sufficiently support believing QF; and
Sophie's higher-order evidence sufficiently supports believing QH.
We can now return to the question of what the total evidence in each case supports. Given the above stipulations, one might be tempted to reason as follows:
Naïve argument
Driver's Bias:
(1) John's first-order evidence decisively supports BPF.
(2) John's higher-order evidence sufficiently supports B~PH.
(3) So, John's total evidence decisively supports BPF and sufficiently supports B~PH.
Poor Logic:
(1) Sophie's first-order evidence does not sufficiently support BQF.
(2) Sophie's higher-order evidence sufficiently supports BQH.
(3) So, Sophie's total evidence does not sufficiently support BQF and sufficiently supports BQH.
Each conclusion, if true, constitutes a counterexample to the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence: the first conclusion violates the first clause in the Impossibility of Self-Misleading
Evidence in virtue of saying that John's total evidence at once decisively supports believing PF This much should be uncontroversial.
But in a recent paper, Worsnip (2018) puts forth what may be seen as a refined version of the naïve argument, which purports to show that even if we take into account the possibility that Driver's Bias and Poor Logic are cases of epistemic defeat, they still constitute genuine counterexamples to the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence (at least on some ways of filling in the details of the cases). Here is a minimal and somewhat liberal reconstruction of Worsnip's argument, as it applies to Driver's Bias: 8
Asymmetry argument W1 John's first-order evidence supports PF more strongly than his higher-order evidence supports ~PF.
W2 John's higher-order evidence supports ~PH more strongly than his first-order evidence supports PH.
W3 So, John's total evidence supports both PF and ~PH. 7 For overviews of different issues related to epistemic defeat, see Kelly (2016) and Koons (2017) . 8 Worsnip's own discussion centers on a case that is structurally similar to Poor Logic; one where the first-order evidence by itself does not support the relevant first-order proposition (see Worsnip 2018, §4.b) . However, his argument applies mutatis mutandis to Driver's Bias and other similar cases of misleading higher-order evidence.
As far as I can see, nothing of importance hinges on which åarticular case of misleading higher-order evidence is used as a backdrop for the present discussion.
Two initial remarks about this reconstruction are in order. First, the exposition in Worsnip (2018) is in large part devoted to establishing two asymmetry claims that are distinct from W1
and W2: first, the claim that the higher-order evidence bears more strongly on PH than on PF;
and, second, the claim that the first-order evidence (if anything) bears more strongly on PF than on PH. However, since these claims have no straightforward bearing on the relevant conclusion, which is W3, I take it that Worsnip ultimately wants (and needs) to establish two asymmetry claims akin to W1 and W2 that do bear on W3. Second, the conclusion W3 is obviously not a clear-cut counterexample to the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence, since it says nothing about how strongly John's total evidence supports PF and ~PH respectively. However, I do not want to resist the Asymmetry argument on the grounds that the total evidence in cases like Driver's Bias and Poor Logic is ever only weakly self-misleading.
Rather, I want to grant that W3, if true, indeed constitutes a genuine counterexample to the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence. For similar dialectical reasons, I will also straightaway concede the asymmetry claims W1 and W2.
Still, I find the Asymmetry argument unconvincing as it stands. The problem is that W1
and W2 are claims about how the first-order and higher-order evidence bears on PF and PH when taken separately, whereas W3 is a claim about how the first-order evidence and higherorder evidence bears on PF and PH when taken in conjunction. This raises much the same worry that led us to reject the naïve argument: just as the naïve argument draws a conclusion about what the total evidence supports from premises about what the first-order and higherorder evidence supports when taken separately, so the Asymmetry argument draws a conclusion about what the total evidence supports from premises about what the first-order and higher-order evidence supports when taken separately.
Might there be a way of modifying the Asymmetry argument to avoid this problem? One could introduce some additional premises that would ensure, roughly speaking, that the presence of the first-order evidence does not significantly alter the bearing of the higher-order evidence on PF and PH, and that the presence of the higher-order evidence does not significantly alter the bearing of the first-order evidence on PF and PH. That is, one could try to amend the Asymmetry argument with the following premises:
No Bottom-Up Undercutting: The first-order evidence does not undercut the support relation between the higher-order evidence and ~PH.
No Top-Down Undercutting: The higher-order evidence does not undercut the support relation between the first-order evidence and PF.
The term 'undercutting' is here used in the customary way, as introduced by Pollock (1974) .
That is, if a body of evidence supports a given doxastic attitude, an undercutting defeater is But the present considerations against No Top-Down Undercutting do not merely fend off the Asymmetry argument; they also lend more direct support to the view that selfmisleading evidence is impossible. To see why, it is useful to reformulate the foregoing points about the normative impact of John and Sophie's respective bodies of higher-order evidence in terms of the changes it should make to their conditional doxastic attitudes towards PF and QF. We can think of an agent's conditional doxastic attitudes as reflecting the way in which the agent takes different bodies of evidence to bear on different propositions. For example, my doxastic attitude towards the proposition "it has recently been raining" conditional on "the streets are wet" is belief, since I take wet streets to be strong evidence for recent rain. By contrast, my doxastic attitude towards "it has recently been raining" conditional on "the streets are dry" is disbelief, since I take dry streets to be strong evidence against recent rain.
Finally, my doxastic attitude towards "it has recently been raining" conditional on "Paris is the capital of France" is suspension of judgment, since I take the fact that Paris is the capital of France to have no significant bearing on whether or not it has recently been raining. 9 Hence, I take the notion of a conditional all-or-nothing doxastic attitude to play much the same role in the present context as the notion of a conditional graded doxastic attitude plays in a Bayesian context. Just as conditional graded doxastic attitudes reflect the way in which Bayesian agents take different bodies of evidence to bear on different propositions, so conditional all-or-nothing doxastic attitudes reflect the way in which 'non-Bayesian' agents take different bodies of evidence to bear on different propositions. 10 We can then ask: how, if at all, should John and Sophie revise their conditional doxastic attitudes towards PF and QF in light of their respective bodies of higher-order evidence? Recall that before John receives the relevant higher-order evidence, his doxastic attitude towards PF conditional on the first-order evidence is belief. By assumption, this conditional doxastic attitude is rational, since his first-order evidence is assumed to support PF. However, after having received the higher-order evidence, it is no longer rational for him to have his original conditional doxastic attitude towards PF, since the higher-order evidence indicates that his first-order evidence does not support PF. That is, there is a rational pressure for John to revise his conditional doxastic attitude towards PF from belief to suspension of judgment (or perhaps even disbelief, depending on how we fill in the details of the case).
A similar story may be told about Sophie: before she receives the relevant higher-order evidence, her doxastic attitude towards QF conditional on the first-order evidence is belief. By assumption, this conditional doxastic attitude is irrational, since her first-order evidence is assumed not to support QF. However, after having received the higher-order evidence, it is rational for Sophie to have her original conditional doxastic attitude towards QF, because the higher-order evidence strongly indicates that her first-order evidence indeed supports QF.
Thus, while John's higher-order evidence creates a rational pressure to revise his conditional doxastic attitude, Sophie's higher-order evidence alleviates an existing rational pressure to revise her original conditional doxastic attitude.
As flagged in the introduction, the lesson I want to draw from these considerations is that higher-order evidence acquires its normative force by influencing which conditional doxastic attitudes it is rational to have. In Driver's Bias, the higher-order evidence has a normative impact on John's doxastic attitude towards PF, because it requires him to revise his conditional doxastic attitude towards PF from belief to suspension of judgment. In Poor Logic, the higherorder evidence has a normative impact on Sophie's doxastic attitude towards QF, because it makes it rational for her to retain her conditional doxastic attitude towards QF. We thus have Obviously, none of this conclusively shows that self-misleading evidence can never occur.
Even if cases like Driver's Bias and Poor Logic are not cases of self-misleading evidence, there might be other types of cases that are. In particular, I have said nothing to sway those philosophers who want to reject the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence on the grounds that one can lack access to one's evidence (even if one cannot be misled about what one's evidence supports). 11 This issue is firmly rooted in the ongoing dispute between internalists and externalists about epistemic rationality, and lies well beyond the scope of this paper. But at the very least, I hope to have offered some reasons to think that the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence should not be rejected on the grounds that one can receive strong misleading higher-order evidence about what one's first-order evidence supports.
Before I proceed, let me note that the idea that we sometimes ought to revise our conditional doxastic attitudes is not a new one. For instance, Lange (1999) has argued that a number of central problems in Bayesian confirmation theory can be resolved if we allow for certain credal changes to come about as the result of revising our conditional credences (or 'confirmation commitments' as he follows Levi (1980) in calling them). Along similar lines, Brössel and Eder (2014) and Rosenkranz and Schulz (2015) have suggested that certain types of peer disagreement should lead the disagreeing parties to revise their credences in the disputed proposition conditional on the shared evidence. So the idea that certain types of doxastic changes should come about as the result of revising one's conditional doxastic attitudes has already been put to use in a few different contexts. What I want to suggest here is that the same idea may serve as the basis of a fairly general view of the normative significance of higher-order evidence.
Further Explanatory Attractions
With the core proposal on the table, I now want to provide some further motivation of the idea that higher-order evidence works by influencing which conditional doxastic attitudes it is rational to have. More specifically, the aim in the following is to illustrate how this idea may help to explain various distinctive features of higher-order evidence that have been pointed out in the recent literature. Doing so will also give me an opportunity to clarify and elaborate a bit on different aspects of the proposed view.
The Retrospectivity of Higher-Order Evidence
First off, the proposed view can help to explain the retrospective aspect of higher-order evidence. A number of authors have pointed out that someone who receives a higher-order defeater thereby acquires a reason to think that his or her doxastic state was irrational even before receiving the higher-order defeater. 12 Take again John as an example: when he receives the information about the driver's bias, he thereby acquires a reason to think that his belief in PF was never supported by his first-order evidence to begin with.
By contrast, first-order evidence does not display the same sort of retrospectivity. If, for example, I believe that it is raining outside on basis of the testimony of a reliable friend, but then look out the window to see that it does not in fact rain, I do not thereby get a reason to think that it was irrational of me to believe as I did before looking out the window. Or, if I believe that the wall in front of me is red on the basis of its looking red, but then learn that the wall is merely lit up by a red spotlight, I do not thereby acquire a reason to think that it was irrational of me to believe as I did before learning about the red spotlight.
Why do higher-order defeaters display a kind of retrospectivity that first-order defeaters do not? The proposed view of higher-order evidence offers a simple explanation: the reason why higher-order defeaters have a retrospective aspect is that they work by indicating that one's original conditional doxastic attitude (that is, the conditional doxastic attitude one had before receiving the higher-order defeater) was initially irrational. By contrast, first-order defeaters do not have a retrospective aspect, because they do not work by indicating that one's original conditional doxastic attitude was initially irrational. On the present picture, this is why higher-order evidence and first-order evidence differ in their retrospective character.
The Agent-Relativity of Higher-Order Evidence
Secondly, the proposed view can help to explain why the normative force of a body of higherorder evidence in many cases depends on who possesses it. To illustrate this agent-relativity, consider a case adapted from Christensen (2010, p. 187) :
Arithmetic on Drugs: You and I decide to calculate, independently of each other, the square root of 121. Unbeknownst to us, we both settle on the answer 11 and, accordingly, form the belief that "√121 = 11." Upon having performed our calculations, we both learn that I have been given a reason-distorting drug that subtly, but significantly, impairs my ability to perform even simple arithmetic calculations.
In this case, it looks like the higher-order evidence (that is, the information that I have been
given a reason-distorting drug) has very different implications for how confident You and I should end up being that the square root of 121 is indeed 11: while I should lose confidence in my belief, at least to some extent, there is no apparent reason for You to do the same. After all, the fact that someone else than yourself is drugged is hardly relevant to the question of whether the square root of 121 equals 11.
A pointed out by, e.g., Christensen (2010) and Kelly (2005) , this sort of agent-relativity is a rather peculiar feature of higher-order evidence. We are used to think that the question of how an agent should respond to a given body of evidence should not depend for its answer on who the agent is. Of course, the answer might depend on the agent's background information, since evidential support is not in general monotonic. But the kind of agent-relativity that is at stake in Arithmetic on Drugs remains in place even if we assume that You and I have exactly the same background information. Thus, higher-order evidence seems to give rise to a kind of agent-relativity that differs importantly from the kind of relativity to background information with which we are familiar.
Why is the normative significance of higher-order evidence agent-relative in this way?
Again, the proposed view offers a simple explanation: in Arithmetic on Drugs, the central difference between You and I is that I get a reason to doubt that my first-order evidence supports that "√121 = 11," whereas You do not get a reason to doubt that your first-order evidence supports that "√121 = 11." Consequently, I should revise my conditional doxastic attitude towards "√121 = 11," whereas You should not revise your conditional doxastic attitude towards "√121 = 11". On the present picture, this is why the same body of higherorder evidence may have very different normative implications for different agents, even if those agents share the same background information.
The Insignificance of Hypothetical Higher-Order Evidence
Third, the proposed view can help to explain why the normative significance of a body of higher-order evidence sometimes depends on whether it is regarded as actually obtaining or as merely hypothetically obtaining. To illustrate this phenomenon, consider another case adapted from Christensen (2010, §4):
Cognitive Impairment: Brenda is a formidable scientist who will carry out an experimental test of a hypothesis h during next week. The experiment has two possible outcomes, o1 and o2, where o1 would strongly confirm h and o2 would strongly disconfirm h. Being a formidable scientist, Brenda is well aware of these evidential relations. But she is also aware that she will suffer from a cognitive impairment next week that will make her unable to give a sound assessment of the experimental results. Why does higher-order evidence differ from first-order evidence in this respect? The proposed view once again offers a possible explanation: when Brenda learns that she is drugged, she should not simply respond to this higher-order evidence by conditionalizing on it, but should also revise her doxastic attitude towards h conditional on o1 (from belief to suspension of judgment in the case at hand). Consequently, her resulting doxastic attitude towards h will not match her prior doxastic attitude towards h conditional on o1 in conjunction with the fact that she will be cognitively impaired next week. By contrast, when Joe learns that one of the key measurement devices is defective, he should simply respond to this first-order evidence by conditionalizing on it. Consequently, his resulting doxastic attitude towards h will match his prior doxastic attitude towards h conditional on o1 in conjunction with the fact that one of the key measurement devices is defective next week. On the present picture, this is why higher-order evidence (at least sometimes) depends for its normative significance on whether it is regarded as learnt or supposed, whereas first-order evidence does not.
The Indirectness of Higher-Order Evidence
Finally, the proposed view can help to make sense of the previously mentioned intuition that first-order evidence somehow bears directly on the proposition at hand in a way that higherorder evidence does not. This distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' evidence is somehow supposed to capture two distinct ways in which a body of evidence might bear on a
proposition. But what, exactly, might this supposed difference amount to?
The proposed view suggests the following answer: higher-order evidence is 'indirect' evidence in the sense that it influences which doxastic attitudes it is rational to have by way of influencing which conditional doxastic attitudes it is rational to have (conditional, that is, on the relevant first-order evidence). For example, John's higher-order evidence about the driver's bias bears indirectly on the question of whether he is a superior driver in virtue of requiring him to revise his doxastic attitude towards PF conditional on the first-order evidence about his driving habits and track-record. By contrast, first-order evidence is 'direct' evidence in the sense that it influences which doxastic attitudes it is rational to have by way of requiring one to conditionalize one's doxastic attitudes on it. For example, John's first-order evidence bears directly on the question of whether he is a superior driver in virtue of requiring him to revise his doxastic attitude towards PF as a result of conditionalizing on this evidence. On the present picture, this is what the intuitive distinction between direct and indirect evidence amounts to.
Concluding remarks
I have suggested that higher-order evidence acquires its normative force by influencing which conditional doxastic attitudes it is rational to have. If so, we have a way of maintaining that cases of misleading higher-order evidence about what one's first-order evidence supports are not cases of self-misleading evidence. This is an important result, since Evidentialism and the Enkratic Principle jointly imply that such self-misleading evidence is impossible. Thus, the considerations put forth give us a way of accommodating the Enkratic Principle within an evidentialist framework.
This obviously does not show that either thesis is true. Even if what I have said about the normative significance of higher-order evidence is basically correct, there might be independent reasons to reject Evidentialism or the Enkratic Principle (or both). But I hope to have provided at least some tentative reasons to think that Evidentialism, the Enkratic Principle, and the proposed view of higher-order evidence together form an attractive theoretical package.
The present chapter is clearly just a first step towards a complete theory of the normative significance of higher-order evidence. This is partly due to the lack of a detailed comparison with other candidate approaches to higher-order evidence, which I have not aimed to undertake in this chapter. 13 But perhaps more to the point, I have done little to spell out how, exactly, a given body of higher-order evidence should influence a given conditional doxastic attitude that an agent might have. I suspect that the various peculiar features of higher-order evidence discussed in the previous section will feature as central pieces in the final puzzle. But the finer details must wait for future work.
